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A B S T R A C T   
The default effect has been identified as a powerful tool to influence behavior; however, the current studies 
demonstrate that consumers dodge the effects of healthy defaults by selecting away from the healthy default 
environment, thereby reducing its effect. Two studies with real consequences and three hypothetical scenario 
studies in restaurant settings demonstrate that healthy defaults promote healthy food choice in the moment, but 
consumers choose to put themselves in environments with unhealthy defaults over those with healthy defaults. 
That is, healthy defaults negatively impact sales and willingness of consumers to return to the restaurant that 
offers them. Study 1 provides initial evidence that a healthy default reduces sales of the product compared to a 
less healthy default in a real gift shop. Study 2 uses an online survey with real consequences and demonstrates 
that participants prefer to receive meal kits from a company with unhealthy defaults over one with healthy 
defaults. Studies 3–5 use hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate the tendency for consumers to dodge healthy 
defaults. Study 3 shows that a healthy default can drive away future sales. Study 4 demonstrates that advertising 
a healthy default reduces interest in visiting the restaurant; that is, advertising healthy defaults drives away first- 
time sales. Finally, Study 5 shows that this dodge effect is robust in a between-subject manipulations using a well- 
known brand. The results demonstrate that consumers dodge healthy defaults by migrating to environments 
where unhealthy defaults are in place.   
1. Introduction 
Food consumption choices are linked to heart disease and cancer, 
leading causes of death in the US (Mokdad et al., 2000), yet few 
behavioral interventions show consistent and long-term effects on what 
people choose to eat. Recent research in psychology and behavioral 
economics has identified the default effect as a powerful, low cost 
method to “nudge” people towards optimal behavior in retirement 
savings (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 
2001; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), consumer purchases (Brown & Krishna, 
2004; Park, Jun, & MacInnis, 2000), buying green electricity (Pichert & 
Katsikopoulos, 2008), vaccination (Chapman, Li, Colby, & Yoon, 2010; 
Chapman, Li, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2016), and end of life decisions 
(Kressel & Chapman, 2007; Kressel, Chapman, & Leventhal, 2007). A 
default option is “the choice alternative a consumer receives if he/she 
does not explicitly specify otherwise” (Brown & Krishna, 2004), and the 
default effect refers to the tendency for people to stick to the default 
option instead of selecting an alternative option. Healthy defaults have 
been widely suggested as a specific intervention to improve the 
healthfulness of food eaten outside the home (e.g. Loewenstein, Brenan 
& Volp, 2007), although little research has examined the effect of de-
faults on actual food choices. While the default effect has high potential 
to facilitate choice of healthy foods, in the current paper, we examine a 
countervailing effect that reduces the benefits of healthy defaults. 
Imagine a consumer who on Monday orders a sandwich at a 
restaurant A, where the default side dish is French fries, although carrot 
sticks can be substituted upon request for no additional cost. On 
Tuesday, this same consumer goes to a different sandwich restaurant, 
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restaurant B, where the default side dish is carrot sticks, although French 
fries can be substituted if requested. One question of interest is at which 
restaurant the consumer is more likely to end up getting the healthier 
carrot sticks, and previous research on the default effect indicates that it 
is restaurant B, because placing carrot sticks as the default option makes 
them more likely to be chosen. A second question of interest, however, is 
to which restaurant will our consumer return on Wednesday? This 
question has not received systematic exploration in previous research, 
and we predict that many consumers will prefer to return to restaurant 
A, the one that provides French fries by default. That is, decision makers 
will dodge the effects of the healthy dietary default by selecting a con-
sumer environment that uses unhealthy defaults. The current studies test 
this prediction. 
Previous research has not addressed how changing a default may 
impact consumer choices about which restaurant or store to patronize, 
despite the fact that such secondary effects of defaults would have large 
implications for the viability of restaurants that set up these defaults. In 
this paper, we test how implementing healthy defaults in restaurant 
settings can affect what people choose to eat, but we also investigate the 
effect of healthy defaults on sales, customer intentions to visit, and 
customer willingness to return. 
An exploration of the secondary effects of default interventions is 
particularly important because defaults are often applied to large, un-
selected populations that likely contain many individuals who do not 
wish to change their health behavior. It is instructive to distinguish two 
types of health interventions. One category of interventions serves a 
targeted, self-selected group of individuals. For example, people wishing 
to change their diet may consult a nutritionist or join a weight loss 
program that provides behavioral interventions or nudges to help the 
individuals with their behavior change goals. Such individuals would 
presumably be delighted to receive these interventions and unlikely to 
dodge them. In contrast, another category of health interventions, such 
as soda taxes or calorie labeling legislation, are applied to an entire 
population, including both individuals who would welcome these in-
terventions because they align with their own goals, and individuals 
who may wish to dodge the effects of the interventions due to conflicting 
preferences or different goals. These population-level health in-
terventions could potentially be dodged by, for example, purchasing 
soda in a nearby municipality that lacks the tax (Roberto et al., 2019). A 
restaurant changing a dietary default that applies to all customers falls in 
this latter category of health interventions. Customers who do not wish 
to consume the healthy option can opt out of the healthy default (e.g., 
request French fries rather than taking the default carrot sticks), but they 
can also dodge the default intervention by patronizing a different 
restaurant with an unhealthy default. 
1.1. Health interventions 
Traditional interventions to promote healthy eating most commonly 
focus on ways to educate the consumer, or to present useful health in-
formation in ways that make it easier for consumers to understand. 
These interventions have had mixed results. For example, simplified 
visual summaries such as “traffic lights” have been found to decrease the 
consumption of unhealthy foods labeled with a red light (Thorndike, 
Riis, & Sonnenberg, 2014) but the presence of a nutrition logo indicating 
a healthier option on menus had no effect on consumption (Vyth et al., 
2011). Interventions that rely on choice architecture to change food 
choices have typically been more successful (Cadario & Chandon, 2019; 
Duckworth, Milkman, & Laibson, 2018; Liu, Wisdom, Roberto, Liu, & 
Ubel, 2014; Roberto & Kawachi, 2014). The largest effects come from 
behaviorally oriented interventions such as convenience manipulations 
(healthy grab-and-go or pre-portioned options, placing healthy food at 
the beginning of the cafeteria line, healthy defaults; Cadario & Chandon, 
2019). Although previous research has examined the effect of the 
healthy dietary defaults on hypothetical choices (e.g., Coffino & 
Hormes, 2018; Giesen, Geyskens, Goukens, & Havermans, 2013), few 
studies have examined the effects of default on actual food choices (Just 
& Price, 2013). Most importantly, previous studies have not explored 
the long-term effects of defaults on customer preferences or the tendency 
for consumers to dodge defaults. 
A landmark study by Johnson and Goldstein (2003) demonstrated 
the power of the default effect: Organ donation rates are higher in Eu-
ropean countries with an opt-out system, where the default is to be an 
organ donor, than in countries with an opt-in system, where the default 
is to be a non-donor. Similarly, automatic enrollment in retirement plans 
has been hugely successful at increasing savings rates (Choi et al., 2003; 
Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Both of these well- 
known examples entail one-off decisions; in contrast, dietary decisions 
are made multiple times per day often in varying settings. In addition, 
dodging an organ donation or retirement enrollment default would 
entail high cost, such as moving to a different country or employer that 
uses the desired default. In contrast, dodging a dietary default is often as 
easy as not returning to a particular restaurant and choosing to patronize 
the one next door the next time. Consequently, dietary decisions 
represent an important domain for examining consumers’ tendency to 
avoid the effects of defaults in repeated decisions. 
1.2. Dodging interventions 
Previous research has investigated the negative effects of in-
terventions designed to change behavior. Negative spillover—the phe-
nomenon whereby the impact of an intervention is partially undone 
because consumers engage in compensatory behavior—can occur when, 
for example, the introduction of a soda tax prompts consumers to pur-
chase soda in a nearby municipality that lacks the tax (Roberto et al., 
2019), or a manipulation to encourage lower calorie entrees prompts 
consumers to purchase higher-calorie side dishes and beverages (Wis-
dom, Downs, & Loewenstein, 2010). Negative spillover is sometimes 
avoided – prompting customers to downsize their rice portion does not 
result in selection of higher-calorie entrees (Schwartz, Riis, Elbel, & 
Ariely, 2012), and calorie labeling at a coffee chain resulted in fewer 
food calories purchased without a corresponding increase in beverage 
calories purchased (Bollinger, Leslie, & Sorensen, 2011). Studies have 
also found that decision makers avoid exposing themselves to in-
terventions intended to encourage prosocial behavior. For example, 
people strategically avoid supermarket entrances where the Salvation 
Army is soliciting donations (Andreoni, Rao, & Trachtman, 2017) and 
similarly avoid a task where they might feel obligated to behave pro-
socially (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Schwartz, Keenan, Imas, & 
Gneezy, 2017). 
Despite recent work on the possible negative consequences of 
nudging consumers with defaults or other nudge interventions (Raihani, 
2013), little research has examined how defaults can have a negative 
impact on the businesses that implement them. While healthy defaults 
may nudge people towards healthy options, they could also drive po-
tential consumers away from making any food purchase in the nudge 
environment. Indeed, past research has demonstrated that default ef-
fects can have boundaries. For example, Park et al. (2000) found that 
consumers chose to have more features on a car when a default car 
model was expensive and loaded with many fancy features compared to 
when the default was a basic model with few features. However, when 
consumers had low commitment to buying a car to begin with, the 
expensive, feature-loaded default option made them less likely to buy a 
car at all, even though they were free to add or remove any feature from 
the default model. 
We examine whether consumers avoid a default condition that 
would encourage selection of the healthy food. That is, we assess 
whether healthy defaults result in a negative spillover effect such that 
consumers avoid being exposed to the healthy default, thereby reducing 
the net effect of the healthy default on healthy food consumption. We 
define the dodge effect behaviorally as avoiding the setting that uses a 
healthy default in favor of a setting that uses an unhealthy default. 
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Specifically, we predict that healthy defaults will foster choice of the 
healthy option for consumers who are in the healthy default environ-
ment, but at the same time, healthy defaults will also drive customers 
away from this environment altogether. These studies will present evi-
dence that customers who have experienced a restaurant environment 
with a healthy default and one with an unhealthy default will on 
average, other things equal, prefer to return to the restaurant with the 
unhealthy default. Furthermore, experience with ordering food and 
seeing the consequences of one’s choice is not necessary for consumers 
to dodge healthy defaults. Simply knowing that a restaurant uses a 
healthy default will decrease preferences for going to that restaurant 
relative to an analogous restaurant with an unhealthy default. 
Why would healthy defaults drive away customers, who could easily 
opt out of the default if they do not like it? Examining which consumers 
are mostly likely to dodge the healthy default can shed light on this 
question. One possibility is that consumers who have an unsatisfying 
dining experience due to sticking with the default will be particularly 
likely to avoid the healthy default restaurant in the future. Consider 
again our consumer who on Tuesday orders a sandwich with a default 
side of carrot sticks. Due to the power of the default effect, she is likely to 
stick with that default even if she does not enjoy carrots. The lunch she 
obtains consequently includes a disliked component, and this unenjoy-
able dining experience may prompt our consumer not to return to that 
restaurant. Thus, it is the mismatch between the consumer’s preferences 
(she likes fries) and the restaurant’s default (given the default she is 
likely to end up with carrots) that prompts her to avoid the healthy 
default restaurant. Put simply, consumers may prefer restaurants where 
they can easily obtain their preferred foods without the effort or stigma 
of opting out of a healthy default. 
1.3. Current studies 
The current research includes five studies that examined the ten-
dency for consumers to dodge healthy dietary defaults. Study 1 provides 
initial evidence for dodging defaults. This study combined experimental 
manipulations with a real-world environment at a campus retail shop, 
where we manipulated the default snack included with the purchase of a 
coffee mug. We tested whether the presence of a healthy default reduces 
sales compared to an unhealthy default. Study 2 used an online survey 
with real consequences to test whether participants choose to receive 
actual meal kits from a company that uses unhealthy defaults over one 
that uses healthy defaults. Studies 3–5 used hypothetical scenarios. 
Study 3 tested whether a healthy default can reduce willingness to re-
turn to a restaurant, and hence reduce repeat sales. Study 4 tested 
whether advertising a healthy default reduces willingness to try a 
restaurant. Study 5 tested the dodge effect in a different design using a 
well-known brand. 
All materials and data are posted on Open Science Framework (OSF) 
at https://osf.io/b23r8/?view_only=7cd985fc08ff4a4a8db68d59244dd 
945. In addition, Study 2 was pre-registered at https://aspredicted. 
org/hz3z7.pdf. 
2. Study 1 
In this field study we manipulated the default condition for an item 
that was available for purchase in a retail store setting, with highly 
visible signage indicating the presence of an alternative option. The 
participants were real customers spending their own money, who were 
not aware that an experiment was taking place. We examined the ten-
dency for healthy defaults to decrease sales. One potential limitation of 
default effects is that customers may select away from a less appealing 
default, deciding not to purchase the item category at all (or to go to 
another store), despite their freedom to choose an alternative option 
within the item category. This study took place in a store where many 
consumers frequently browsed without specific intent to make a pur-
chase, and thus purchase likelihood may be sensitive to the default. 
2.1. Methods 
This study was conducted in the student store of a large university’s 
law school. The store sells law-school-branded apparel, gifts, and office 
supplies, including law school coffee mugs. During the normal course of 
business, the mugs were sold empty. However, during the study period, 
the mugs came with a free snack packed inside such that the desired 
experimental manipulation was possible. During the study each mug 
available for sale was filled with a snack packed in a clear cellophane 
baggie: either M&M’S®, an unhealthy snack (258 calories and 11 g of fat 
per ¼ cup) or a healthier fruit and nut mix (140 calories and 6 g of fat per 
¼ cup). 
The default snack packed in the mugs was alternated on a weekly 
basis for four weeks, with each week starting Saturday and ending 
Friday. A small placard was placed next to the mugs in each of the two 
places in the store where the mugs were displayed, which read 
“M&M’S® [fruit and nut mix] also available, just ask the cashier” 
(depending on condition). A cashier was present at all times when the 
store was open, with easy access to bags of the non-default snack option 
under the counter. 
2.2. Results 
During the two weeks in which M&M’S® were the default snack, 14 
mugs were sold, all of which were sold with M&M’S® (100%). During 
the two weeks in which the fruit and nut mix was the default snack, 8 
mugs were sold, and only 1 mug was sold with M&M’S® (12.5%) 
(Fisher’s exact test = 12.97, p < .001), demonstrating a default effect. 
To examine whether the healthy default snack inside the coffee mug 
discouraged consumers from purchasing the mug (despite their freedom 
to switch to the more appealing yet less healthy M&M’S® as the free 
Fig. 1. Mug sales in study 1 by condition (A) and by week (B). Note: (A) 
Different colored bars represent mean number of mugs sold by period: pre-study 
period (white bars), M&M’S® default period (black bars), and fruit and nut 
default period (gray bars), shown separately for mug sales per $10 of revenue, 
per transaction, and per item sold; (B) Separate lines represent weekly mean 
number of mugs sold per $10 of revenue (dashed line), per transaction (dotted 
line), and per item sold by week (dash-dot line). Sales staff shift was the unit of 
analysis in both graphs. Error bars = ±2SE in both. 
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snack), we analyzed mug sales adjusting for overall sales in the store. 
Sales data from the three weeks previous to the experiment served as the 
baseline period in analyses of mug sales adjusted for overall sales. We 
examined three measures of adjusted mug sales: Number of mugs sold 
per $10 revenue, number of mugs sold per transaction, and number of 
mugs sold per item sold in the store. Shifts with no transactions at all 
were excluded from the analysis because the denominator would be 
zero. We used cashier shift as the unit of analysis (n = 13, 7, and 30 for 
the M&M default, fruit and nut mix default, and base periods for shifts 
with transactions; Mean length of shift = 1.57 h, SD = 1.28). See mean 
mug sales in these three measures by condition in Fig. 1A and by week in 
Fig. 1B. 
We conducted three one-way ANOVAs on the three mug sales mea-
sures. Results indicate a significant difference between the M&M’S® 
default, fruit and nut mix default, and base periods for mug sales per 
transaction, F (2, 47) = 3.79, p = .03, and a marginal difference for mug 
sales per $10 revenue F (2, 24.27) = 3.28, p = .055 (Welch test due to 
unequal variance) and for mug sales per item sold, F (2, 47) = 12.61, p =
.08 . 
We further conducted robust contrasts between pairs of conditions 
(not assuming equal variance). As shown in Fig. 1A, compared to the 
fruit and nut mix default condition, the M&M’S® default condition had 
significantly more mug sales per $10 revenue, t (12.91) = 2.59, p = .022, 
and marginally more mug sales per transaction, t (17.26) = 1.85, p =
.081, and per item sold, t (13.90) = 1.86, p = .084. It is apparent, 
however, that the M&M’S® default condition also had greater mug sales 
compared to the baseline condition, t (15.29) = 2.34, p = .033, and per 
transaction, t (17.65) = 2.29, p = .035, and the difference was 
marginally significant for mug sales per item sold, t (16.45) = 1.74, p =
.099. In contrast, the fruit and nut mix default condition showed no 
significant difference in mug sales compared to the baseline comparison, 
p > .58 for all three measures. When these comparisons were conducted 
as non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U test), the only significant 
differences emerged between the M&M’S® default condition and the 
baseline condition, U = 101.50, 110.00, and 109.50 in the analysis for 
mug sales per $10 of revenue, per transaction, and per item, p = .012, 
0.024, and 0.022, respectively. Descriptively, the weekly mug sales plot 
(Fig. 1B) also shows a rise during the two weeks of the study when 
M&M’S® was the default (Week 4 and 6 in Fig. 1B, although the spike in 
Week 6 only occurred in one of the three measures of mug sales), 
compared to the two weeks of the study when fruit and nut mix was the 
default (Week 5 and 7 in Fig. 1B), as well as compared to the three weeks 
at baseline (Weeks 1–3 in Fig. 1B). 
2.3. Discussion 
This study demonstrates that defaults can have a significant impact 
on behavior in retail settings in which customers are spending their own 
money to make real purchases. Although both the fruit and nut mix and 
the M&M’S® were available to customers who purchased a coffee mug, 
customers preferred to take the default snack that was pre-packed in the 
mug. Thus, a simple change of default nudged customers toward the 
healthier option. However, this improvement in healthy eating came at a 
price to the store, with the healthy default reducing mug sales compared 
to the unhealthy default, bringing it down to the level of sales during the 
baseline period when no snack was offered. This suggests that when 
customers are browsing without necessarily having specific intent to 
purchase, a healthy default can lead to lower sales of the product than an 
unhealthy default. The healthy default appears to lead consumers to 
choose to not purchase the item at all, even when the unhealthy item 
could be had for a small transaction cost. That is, consumers dodge the 
default. 
This study was limited in that the presence of potential customers in 
the store varied greatly by day and across periods in the study due to 
exams and other school events, so total, unadjusted sales figures could 
not be compared in a meaningful way. In addition, the sample size was 
quite small and, because participants did not know they were in a 
research study, we could not check that they noticed the signs and un-
derstood it was possible to opt out of the default snack and request the 
alternative one. Study 2 used an online survey paradigm with real 
consequences to provide a large sample size and a check on under-
standing of the default. 
3. Study 2 
The results of Study 1 indicated that consumers may chose not to 
purchase a particular product when the default is healthy, even when an 
unhealthy option is available for a small transaction cost. Study 2 ex-
amines the effect of healthy defaults on product choice in a slightly 
different context: allowing consumers to choose between two brands 
with different defaults. As in Study 1 this study used decisions with real 
consequences. Study 2 was pre-registered at https://aspredicted.org/h 
z3z7.pdf. 
3.1. Methods 
One thousand and two participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk for a small payment. The focal product category for 
this study was meal kits. Meal kits provide weekly home delivery of pre- 
measured ingredients and instructions for cooking, and have become 
increasingly popular, with an estimated at $2.5 billion in sales in 2017 
(Conway, 2020). Consumers have a range of recipes to choose from, and 
if no choice is actively made the company selects meals to send by 
default. In the current study we used Hello Fresh® and Blue Apron® as 
focal brands, as they lead market share with an estimated 28% and 22% 
of the market respectively (Conway, 2020). Both Blue Apron® and Hello 
Fresh® websites indicate some meals as healthier choices, indicated by 
the WW® (formerly Weight Watchers®) logo on the Blue Apron® 
website and by “Calorie Smart” on the Hello Fresh® website. 
Participants were given general information about meal kits and 
were told that they would see two different meal kit providers during the 
study. Each participant saw each of the two meal kit providers, one at a 
time. For each provider, participants saw three pre-selected (default) 
meals for week 1. Participants were randomly assigned to see either Blue 
Apron® with 3 healthy default meals and Hello Fresh® with 3 unhealthy 
default meals, or Blue Apron® with 3 unhealthy default meals and Hello 
Fresh® with 3 healthy default meals. Presentation order of the two 
companies was randomized. 
Below the default meals participants were instructed that if the pre- 
selected options looked good to hit continue, or if they wanted to change 
meals they could write “change” in the text box provided. Participants 
who typed any input in the textbox for each company were automati-
cally directed to a page showing all six (three healthy and three un-
healthy) meals available for that company and asked to choose 
whichever three meals they preferred. 
All participants then saw the meals they selected for the first week 
(or the default meals if they did not opt to change meals). After seeing 
and potentially making selections for both meal kit companies, partici-
pants were informed that as a thank you gift, one participant would be 
randomly selected to receive a month of free meals from either Blue 
Apron® or Hello Fresh®, and asked to make a choice for which brand of 
meal kit they would like to receive. Participants then completed two 
comprehension check questions to determine if they were aware they 
could choose away from the default for each meal kit company, 
completed an attention check (a simple shopping scenario where they 
needed to identify the cheapest item), and provided demographic 
information. 
3.2. Results 
Of a total of 1002 participants, 927 passed a simple attention check 
question at the end of the study and are included in the analysis. Per the 
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pre-registration, and as a test for the default effect, we analyzed the 
number of healthy meals chosen in a meal kit company (Within-Subject: 
Blue Apron® or Hello Fresh®) × condition (Between-Subject: Blue 
Apron® unhealthy default & Hello Fresh® healthy default, vs. Blue 
Apron® healthy default & Hello Fresh® unhealthy default) mixed 
factorial ANOVA. As predicted, the ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between condition and meal kit company, F (1, 925) =
2329.60, p < .001. partial η2 = 0.72. Focused contrasts showed that 
participants chose more healthy meals from Hello Fresh® when Hello 
Fresh® had healthy vs. unhealthy default meals, Ms = 2.46 (SD = 0.89) 
vs. 0.37 (SD = 0.77), F (1, 925) = 1453.10, partial η2 = 0.61; likewise, 
participants chose more healthy meals from Blue Apron® when Blue 
Apron® had healthy vs. unhealthy default meals, Ms = 2.19 (SD = 1.00) 
vs. 0.35 (SD = 0.65), F (1, 925) = 1096.44, partial η2 = 0.54. 
We next tested the dodge effect per the pre-registration. Descrip-
tively, when Blue Apron® had unhealthy meals as default, 47.5% of 
participants chose Blue Apron® over Hello Fresh®; when Blue Apron® 
had healthy meals as default, only 33.3% chose Blue Apron® (See 
Fig. 2). In a logistic regression on choice (1 = Blue Apron®, 0 = Hello 
Fresh®), with condition (0.5 = Blue Apron® unhealthy default & Hello 
Fresh® healthy default, − 0.5 = Blue Apron® healthy default & Hello 
Fresh® unhealthy default), display order (0.5 = healthy default meal kit 
first, − 0.5 = unhealthy default meal kit first), and their interaction as 
predictors, condition had a significant effect on choice, Wald χ2(1, N =
927) = 19.35, p < .001, odds ratio = 1.82, 95% CI [1.39, 2.37], indi-
cating a greater likelihood of choosing Blue Apron® when it had an 
unhealthy vs. healthy default, that is, a dodge effect. Neither display 
order (χ2(1, N = 927) = 0.25, p = .62) nor the interaction between 
condition and display order (χ2.(1, N = 927) = 0.07, p = .79) had a 
significant effect. The logistic regression model correctly classified 
59.5% of participants and had a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.03. 
As an additional exploratory analysis, we further tested the dodge 
effect among the 473 (51.0%) participants who stuck with the defaults 
for both meal kit companies (did not choose any non-default meals). We 
found that 52.9% vs. 35.5% of participants chose Blue Apron® when it 
had unhealthy vs. healthy defaults, and performing a logistic regression 
as above showed that condition was a significant predictor of choice, 
Wald χ2(1, N = 473) = 14.10, p < .001, odds ratio = 2.04, 95% CI [1.41, 
2.96], indicating a dodge effect among participants who stuck with the 
default. Interestingly, among the 453 (49.0%) participants who opted 
out of the default for either meal kit company (chose at least one non- 
default meal), the dodge effect was also present, but smaller: 40.6% 
vs. 31.5% of participants chose Blue Apron® when it had unhealthy vs. 
unhealthy defaults, and logistic regression showed condition as a sig-
nificant predictor of choice, with a smaller effect than before, Wald χ2(1, 
N = 453) = 4.11, p = .043, odds ratio = 1.49, 95% CI [1.01, 2.20]. 
Note that of the 927 total participants included in the main analyses 
above, 73 failed at least one of the two comprehension questions about 
whether they had the option of changing meals from the default 
(including 2 who did not respond to the questions), leaving 854 (92.1%) 
of the participants who showed a clear understanding that they could 
opt out of the default and choose other meals. As planned in the pre- 
registration, we restricted the data to the 854 (92.1%) participants 
who clearly knew about alternative meals and repeated the main ana-
lyses, and found very similar results with regard to the default effect 
(interaction between condition and meal kit company in ANOVA F (1, 
852) = 2018.90, p < .001. partial η2 = 0.70), as well as the dodge effect 
(47.9% vs. 33.8% choosing Blue Apron® when it had unhealthy vs. 
healthy defaults, effect of condition in logistic regression Wald χ2(1, N =
854) = 17.49, p < .001, odds ratio = 1.81, 95% CI [1.37, 2.38]), con-
firming the robustness of these findings. 
3.3. Discussion 
These results indicate that consumers may be significantly influ-
enced in choice between products or brands by the default, even when a 
more appealing option is easily available. This suggests that companies 
that attempt to encourage healthy choices may be doing themselves a 
disservice, as consumers may choose away from their products when 
presented with a healthy default. In this study, participants chose to 
dodge the healthy default by simply choosing a different meal kit brand. 
In industries with stiff competition and many available alternatives, as 
exist with meal kits, the negative impact of providing a healthy default 
could have significant consequences. Study 2 also demonstrated that the 
dodge effect was robust in analyses restricted to participants who 
showed a clear understanding about the availability of alternative 
meals, suggesting that the dodge effect is not simply driven by people 
not noticing that they had other options beyond the default. 
4. Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 suggest that improving healthy consumption may not 
be as simple as changing the default, as such defaults may have a 
negative impact on consumers’ willingness to purchase, and thus hurt a 
business’s bottom line. Study 1 took place in a store where consumers 
often entered to simply browse. The set-up in Study 2 was such that 
participants could choose away from the healthy default by selecting the 
alternative brand. Next, in Study 3 we examined the effect of a healthy 
default on sales in a restaurant situation where repeat purchases are 
especially relevant. If customers choose the healthy default, but then 
tend not to return, preferring instead other businesses with an unhealthy 
default, changing the default option in this type of setting may not be 
feasible. This study used hypothetical scenarios to test whether healthy 
default options affect consumers’ choices of which restaurants to return 
to. 
4.1. Methods 
Individuals recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 351) 
completed an online survey in exchange for a small payment. Each 
participant saw six restaurant scenarios in sequence. They were told to 
imagine they were trying out three types of new restaurants for lunch: 
Sandwich shops, pizza shops, and burger shops, and would visit two of 
each kind of restaurant and select which one they would prefer to return 
to if they were going to eat that type of food again. 
For each of the three types of restaurants, two alternative restaurants 
were presented to each participant, one with a healthy default and the 
other with an unhealthy default. The specific default food options were 
as follows. Burger shops: turkey or beef burger; pizza shops: whole or 
skim milk mozzarella; sandwich shops: French fries or carrots as the side 
dish. First, participants saw a picture of a restaurant and the menu, with 
the default option listed on the menu, along with the information that 
the alternative could be requested at no additional cost. Participants 
were then asked to select an entrée and drink, and offered the oppor-
tunity to enter any special requests, including the non-default option, in 
a special request text box (the open-ended format of this question was 
Fig. 2. Choice of meal kit company in study 2.  
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meant to mimic real restaurant settings, where people usually choose 
alternative options through verbal request). For example, at the sand-
wich shop, participants learned that sandwich entrées were served with 
French fries (or carrot sticks) as a default but that they could request 
carrot sticks (or French fries) as a substitution. If the participant wanted 
carrots, they would need to type “carrots” or “I want carrots instead” 
etc., into the special request text box, along with any other special re-
quests. After choosing their order, participants saw a picture of their 
food, which included the healthy or unhealthy default they had chosen. 
That is, if a participant stuck with the French fries default they were 
shown a picture of their sandwich with French fries, however if they had 
entered “carrots” or some variation thereof in the text box, they were 
shown a picture of their sandwich with carrots. Participants then moved 
on to order lunch at the other restaurant within the same type, which 
had a different default. After ordering lunch at both restaurants of the 
same type they were asked to choose which one they would be more 
likely to return to. 
We counter-balanced across subjects which restaurant name and 
picture were tied to which default and randomized the order of pre-
sentation within restaurant type (healthy default or unhealthy default 
first) and across restaurant type (burger, pizza, and sandwich). All res-
taurants were creations of the study team, such that participants did not 
enter the restaurants with brand-specific expectations. 
4.2. Results 
Each participant placed six lunch orders, one in each restaurant. 
These lunch orders showed a strong default effect, with 91.57% of 
participants sticking to the healthy default, and 94.57% sticking to the 
unhealthy default overall. The default effect was individually significant 
for each of the three restaurant types, (all McNemar’s χ2(1) ≥ 293, p <
.001). 
We next examined whether default condition affected the choice of 
which restaurant to return to. Each participant made three choices 
concerning which restaurant to return to, one for each type of restau-
rant. We coded whether participants chose to return to the restaurant 
with the healthy default (coded as 1) or the one with the unhealthy 
default (coded as 0) in each of the three restaurant types. We then 
averaged across the three restaurant types to compute the percentage of 
times each participant returned to the restaurant with the healthy 
default. Each participant could have a score of 0 (none of the 3 types of 
restaurant), 0.33 (1 of the 3 types of restaurant), 0.67 (2 of the 3 types of 
restaurant), or 1 (all 3 types of restaurant). If the default condition has 
no effect on return decisions, we would expect this measure to average 
0.5. Of course, no individual participant can have a score of 50%, but if 
no dodge effect occurs, the distribution should be centered around 0.5. 
The mean score was 0.46 (SD = 0.28), which was reliably less than 
0.5 in a one-sample t-test (t(350) = 2.53, p = .01, Cohen’s D = 0.13.). 
This indicates that participants were slightly but significantly less likely 
to return to a restaurant with a healthy default than to a restaurant with 
an unhealthy default. This result constitutes the dodge effect. 
Individual chi-square tests indicated that participants were signifi-
cantly more likely to return to the restaurant with an unhealthy default 
for the burger restaurants (42.69%, χ2(1, N = 349) = 7.45, p < .01), but 
not for sandwich shops (47.13%, χ2(1, N = 348) = 1.15, p = .28) or pizza 
restaurants (48.71%, χ2(1, N = 349) = 0.23, p = .63). We conducted a 
logistic HLM analysis using dummy codes of restaurant type and display 
order within restaurant type (healthy default first or unhealthy default 
first) to predict return to the healthy/unhealthy restaurant. The results 
showed that restaurant type did not affect choice, odds ratio = 1.20, 
95% CI [0.89, 1.61], p = .24 for the comparison between sandwich and 
burger restaurants, and odds ratio = 1.27, 95% CI [0.94, 1.71], p = .11 
for the comparison between pizza and burger restaurants, indicating 
that the dodge effect did not differ significantly in size across the three 
restaurant types. Thus, the dodge effect is statistically detectable when 
the data from the three scenarios are combined, but when each scenario 
is examined individually, the dodge effect is detectable in the burger 
scenario but not the pizza or sandwich scenarios. The HLM analysis also 
showed no effect of display order, odds ratio = 0.98, 95% CI [0.77, 
1.25], p = .87, suggesting that return choice was not affected by whether 
the healthy or unhealthy default restaurant was displayed first within 
each restaurant type. It is unclear why the dodge effect was detectable 
only for the burger restaurant, but this may reflect the fact that the 
overall dodge effect in the current study was modest in size. 
Results also suggest that participants were aware of their ability to 
make specific requests about their food and to request the alternative to 
the default option. Special requests were common, with 149 out of 352 
participants (42%) making a special request on at least one of their six 
orders, and 14.5% of all orders containing special requests. This suggests 
that the high percentage of participants sticking with the default option 
was not due to unwillingness to make special requests, or lack of 
awareness that such requests were possible. 
4.3. Discussion 
Study 3 demonstrated a modest dodge effect, such that participants 
were slightly less likely to return to a restaurant that used a healthy 
default compared to one that used an unhealthy default. This pattern is 
presumably linked to the fact that many people prefer beef to turkey and 
find French fries tastier than carrot sticks. However, the implications of 
this modest finding are far from trivial. The libertarian paternalism logic 
behind defaults and other nudges is that they encourage healthy choice 
while not limiting options; that is, people who truly prefer beef can 
simply opt out of the turkey default. The dodge effect suggests that there 
is a cost, either physical or psychological, levied on beef-lovers when the 
default is turkey – a cost that is sufficient to motivate them to select a 
beef default restaurant in the future. Furthermore, the public health 
purpose of healthy defaults is to encourage people to eat less preferred 
but healthier foods. Given that most people find French fries tastier than 
carrot sticks, how do we encourage them to eat carrot sticks instead? The 
view that dietary defaults are a simple intervention to encourage healthy 
choice is too simplistic, given our results. Such interventions will be less 
effective when consumers have alternative environments to patronize, 
because some French fry loving consumers will not return to the 
restaurant with the carrot stick default – that is, they will act to ensure 
that they are not exposed to the nudge that would encourage them to eat 
healthier. 
5. Study 4 
In Studies 1 and 2 we found that, compared to an unhealthy default, a 
healthy default reduced sales. In Study 3 we found that healthy defaults 
also reduce willingness to return to a restaurant, reducing repeat sales. 
Although in Study 3 novel brands were used to reduce consumer ex-
pectations, it is still possible that the dodge effect is driven by surprise at 
encountering a healthy default in a location where an unhealthy default 
was expected. If so, then one potential method of ameliorating this effect 
is to advertise the healthy default in advance. In Study 4 we investigate 
the effects of an advertised healthy default on willingness to try a new 
restaurant, examining the effect of the healthy default on first-time sales. 
After exploring consumer decisions related to the dodge effect in various 
phases in the above studies: purchase decisions at the store (Study 1), 
purchase decisions after exploring online offerings (Study 2), and return 
decisions after experiencing food choices (Study 3), Study 4 offers a test 
for the dodge effect at a different stage of consumer choice: patronage 
decisions after viewing the advertisement of a healthy default but prior 
to entering the store. 
5.1. Method 
Two hundred and three individuals participated on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk for a small payment. Participants were asked to imagine 
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that they had just started a new job and “In the break room are two ads 
for burger restaurants that are near your office. Today for lunch you feel 
like a burger, so you decide to try out one of them.” Participants then 
saw advertisements for two burger restaurants, “Burger Kaboom” and 
“Tastee Burger” (see Fig. 3), where one restaurant advertised an all-beef 
patty, but noted that turkey patties were available upon request, and the 
other advertised an all-turkey patty but noted that beef patties were 
available upon request. Between subjects, we manipulated which 
restaurant brand had which default to isolate any brand name effect 
from the dodge effect. Thus, the design was a 2 (Restaurant: Kaboom vs. 
Tastee) × 2 (Default match: Kaboom beef/Tastee turkey vs. Kaboom 
turkey/Tastee beef) mixed factorial design, with restaurant as the 
within-subject factor, and default match as the between-subject factor. 
The display order of the two restaurants was also counterbalanced. After 
viewing both advertisements, participants were asked to choose which 
of the two restaurants they would prefer to visit. Participants were also 
asked to rate how difficult it would be to decide what to order at that 
restaurant on a scale of 1 (extremely easy) to 7 (extremely difficult) and 
how appealing the restaurant was on a scale of 1 (not at all appealing) to 
6 (extremely appealing). 
5.2. Results 
A chi-square analysis on choice of restaurant to visit revealed a sig-
nificant effect of default match on restaurant choice, where 70.6% of 
participants preferred “Kaboom” when Kaboom offered a beef default 
and Tastee offered a turkey default, but only 48.5% preferred Kaboom 
when Kaboom offered a turkey default and Tastee offered a beef default. 
Across both default match conditions, 121 out of the 203 participants 
(59.6%) preferred the restaurant with the less healthy beef default, 
significantly above 50%, χ2(1, N = 203) = 9.98, p = .002. In a logistic 
regression predicting the choice between healthy and unhealthy default 
restaurant, we found that this choice was not influenced by which brand 
name was matched with healthy default, Wald χ2(1, N = 927) = 19.35, p 
< .001, odds ratio = 1.82, 95% CI [1.39, 2.37], display order (whether 
healthy or unhealthy default restaurant was displayed first), Wald χ2(1, 
N = 927) = 19.35, p < .001, odds ratio = 1.82, 95% CI [1.39, 2.37], or 
their interaction, Wald χ2(1, N = 927) = 19.35, p < .001, odds ratio =
1.82, 95% CI [1.39, 2.37]. 
In addition, participants indicated greater predicted difficulty when 
ordering from the healthy default restaurant than from unhealthy 
default restaurant, M = 2.77 vs. 2.38, Mean Difference = 0.38 (SD =
1.32), paired sample t (202) = 4.16, p < .001, Cohen’s D = 0.29. They 
also found the healthy default restaurant less appealing than the un-
healthy default restaurant, M = 3.20 vs. 3.63, Mean Difference = 0.43 
(SD = 1.66), paired sample t (202) = 3.72, p < .001, Cohen’s D = 0.26. 
5.3. Discussion 
The results of Study 4 expand on the results of Studies 1–3 by 
demonstrating another stage in the purchase process that can be nega-
tively impacted by healthy defaults. A restaurant advertising a healthy 
default was chosen less frequently than a similar restaurant advertising 
an unhealthy default. Participants also found it less appealing, and ex-
pected it to be more difficult to order in a healthy default restaurant than 
in an unhealthy default restaurant. This suggests that advertising 
healthy defaults, and essentially giving consumers a heads-up before 
they visit the restaurant, may lead to consumers dodging the healthy 
default by choosing not to try healthy default restaurants, driving away 
sales before the potential consumers even get in the door. 
6. Study 5 
In Study 3 we found that consumers who experienced a restaurant 
with a healthy default had a reduced likelihood of returning to the 
restaurant compared to those who experienced a restaurant with an 
unhealthy default, and in Study 4 we found that consumers were less 
likely to choose a restaurant advertised with a healthy default compared 
to one advertised with an unhealthy default. Both studies used a within- 
subject design to examine the effect of the default. In Study 5, we test the 
Fig. 3. Stimuli from study 4.  
H. Colby et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 161 (2020) 50–60
57
dodge effect but with a somewhat different design. We utilized a 
between-subject design, and in addition we used a social default 
manipulation. That is, we allowed the consumer to see what other 
people were ordering ahead of them, mimicking a real restaurant 
ordering experience. Specifically, in Study 5, participants were told 
what the restaurant default was (turkey or beef burgers) and they also 
saw five people ahead of them in line order the default menu item. We 
compared two conditions (healthy default with other customers 
ordering the healthy item vs. unhealthy default with other customers 
ordering the unhealthy item). This design instantiates what realistically 
happens when a restaurant sets a default – not only does the default set 
restaurant practice but this practice then influences what the majority of 
customers receive and hence what each customer observes. 
6.1. Method 
Five hundred and nine individuals participated via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk for a small payment. Participants were presented with a 
scenario about McDonald’s®, a ubiquitous fast-food restaurant, with 
locations in more than 100 countries (McDonalds.com). Individuals 
were presented with a story stating: 
“Imagine that you have just started a new job, and for lunch you decide to 
go to the McDonald’s across the street. You stand in line while the five 
people in front of you order and receive their food.” 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a healthy (turkey 
patty) or unhealthy (beef patty) default condition. In each condition, the 
default was presented in two ways: both through the food orders from 
previous customers, and through a text description of the default right 
before participants were ready to order. Participants first saw a picture 
story with a series of five individuals in front of them in line at a 
McDonald’s® ordering food and then walking away with a tray, one at a 
time. To better represent the likely experience of ordering in a restaurant 
with a default, all five individuals in the picture story received the 
default option. This set up is likely to reinforce the default, as social 
norms can also be experienced as a form of default (Huh, Vosgerau, & 
Morewedge, 2014). Each tray showed a drink and a burger box with 
either “Turkey” (healthy default condition) or “Beef” (unhealthy default 
condition) and the McDonald’s® logo printed on it (see Fig. 4 for an 
example picture). After seeing all five consumers in front of them order 
and receive their food, participants were told that it was their turn to 
order. At the top of the screen they saw the default description in bold, 
which was always consistent with the food choice of the five previous 
consumers: “All burgers are made with turkey [beef] burger patties, but 
beef [turkey] burger patties can be substituted upon request at no 
additional charge”, depending on the default condition participants 
were assigned to. Participants saw the menu including a choice of a 
variety of burgers and drinks to choose from, as well as a text box that 
said “special requests”. 
After ordering, participants saw a picture of their meal including a 
drink and a burger box that said “turkey” or “beef” depending on their 
choice. Participants then indicated how likely they were to return to this 
McDonald’s® next time they felt like a burger, on a scale of 1 (extremely 
unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely). Participants also rated how conflicted 
they felt about what to order when ordering their burger on a scale from 
1 (not at all) to 7 (an extreme amount). Finally, they answered a 
comprehension check question asking “What was the default at the 
restaurant you visited? (That is, what would you receive if you did not 
make any special requests)”, with “Beef burger patty” “Turkey burger 
patty, and “Vegetarian burger patty” as options. 
6.2. Results 
Out of 509 participants, 483 (94.9%) responded to the check ques-
tion correctly. The analysis below includes only these participants, 
although including all participants did not alter the findings. Among 
these participants, there was a strong default effect: When beef burger 
was the default (n = 247), 218 (88.3%) participants stuck to the beef 
default, 25 (10.1%) switched to turkey burger, and 4 (1.6%) requested 
another option not offered in the scenario (e.g., veggie burger); When 
turkey burger was the default (n = 236), 83 (35.2%) participants 
switched to beef burger, 149 (63.1%) stuck with the turkey default, and 
4 (1.7%) requested an option not in the scenario. For simplicity, we 
excluded the 8 participants who requested a non-beef and non-turkey 
Fig. 4. Example stimulus from study 5.  
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burger (such as a veggie burger) in the remaining analysis. A Chi-square 
test shows that the effect of default condition on food choice was sig-
nificant, χ2(1, N = 475) = 148.74, p < .001. Note that including par-
ticipants with the non-beef and non-turkey choice in the analysis yielded 
similar results, Fisher’s exact test = 159.63, p < .001. 
Next, we again tested the dodge effect, this time with default 
manipulated between-subjects. Participants were less willing to return 
to the restaurant if the default burger was a healthy option—turkey (M 
= 4.91, SD = 1.76) compared to an unhealthy option—beef (M = 5.26, 
SD = 1.52), t (473) = 2.60, p = .02, Cohen’s D = 0.21. Participants did 
not show different levels of conflict between default conditions, M =
2.15, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 2.24, SD = 1.76, t (473) = 0.56, p = .58, Cohen’s 
D = 0.05. 
We then test the dodge effect among participants who responded to 
the default manipulation, that is, among participants who stuck with the 
default in their experimental condition (Fig. 5). There were 367 par-
ticipants who stuck with the default, and a t-test found that they were 
less willing to return to the restaurant if the default burger was a healthy 
option—turkey (M = 4.70, SD = 1.84) compared to an unhealthy 
option—beef (M = 5.28, SD = 1.48), t (365) = 3.31, p = .001, Cohen’s D 
= 0.35. Interestingly, when we analyzed the results among the 108 
participants who switched away from the default, the dodge effect did 
not emerge, with similar return ratings in healthy vs. unhealthy default 
conditions, M = 5.29, SD = 1.53 vs. M = 5.08, SD = 1.87, respectively, t 
(106) = 0.57, p = .57, Cohen’s D = 0.11. These means are illustrated in 
Fig. 5. These results, combined with the results from a similar analysis in 
Study 2, point to the possibility that the dodge effect is concentrated 
among those who are most influenced by the default effect and stick 
with whatever default they are given. 
6.3. Discussion 
The results of Study 5 replicated the dodge effect shown in Studies 
1–4 using a between-subject manipulation of default, a real brand, and a 
bolstered default manipulation with a realistic social norm occurring to 
reinforce the healthy or unhealthy default. The use of McDonald’s® as 
the setting also excludes a potential alternative explanation of the 
finding: One potential reason that customers would avoid going back to 
a restaurant is that they may expect restaurants to “specialize” in 
whatever default food option they offer, and if a restaurant offers turkey 
burgers by default, consumers may suspect their beef burgers to be sub- 
par. Therefore, consumers who prefer beef may avoid the restaurant 
offering turkey burgers by default because even if they switch to a beef 
burger in this restaurant, the quality of the beef burger may be ques-
tionable. However, given that McDonald’s® is such a household name 
with standardized operations, such suspicions are unlikely to occur. In 
addition, the results showed that the dodge effect is robust among 
consumers who stuck with the default, but not among consumers who 
switched food options, providing further evidence against the explana-
tion that the dodge effect merely reflects attributions about food quality 
to the restaurants. 
Taken with the previous studies, Study 5 provides strong evidence 
that even though healthy defaults encourage selection of healthy foods, 
they also promote dodging: Consumers are less likely to return to a 
restaurant that uses a healthy default than one that uses a more indul-
gent default. 
7. General discussion 
Our studies demonstrated a dodge effect: Consumers avoid pur-
chasing the product if it has a healthy default in place (Study 1), select a 
different meal-kit brand when the default is healthy (Study 2), avoid 
returning to a restaurant with a healthy default (Studies 3, and 5), and 
avoid selecting a restaurant advertising a healthy default (Study 4). Note 
that the current studies demonstrate two variants on the dodge effect: (i) 
choosing to purchase something else (or nothing at all) when the de-
faults is healthy (Studies 1, 2, 4) and (ii) choosing the healthy default 
when presented with it, but then avoiding that store/restaurant in the 
future (Studies 3, 5). This dodge effect can reduce the impact of default 
manipulations, as consumers with preferences that do not match the 
default will avoid being exposed to that default. Simultaneously, the 
dodge effect could inflate the apparent impact of a default manipulation 
in a non-experimental setting, as the large percentage of consumers 
sticking with the healthy default may in part reflect a self-selecting ef-
fect: consumers who do not wish to consume the healthy option may 
have simply been chased away. 
The current results point to the importance of examining the effect of 
defaults and other nudges not only in the local environment where they 
are in place, but also in upstream decisions when decision makers select 
which environment to enter and in downstream decisions where deci-
sion makers choose whether to return to an environment. Our results 
suggest that consumers may avoid environments where it is difficult to 
satisfy their preferences (e.g., when the environment has a healthy but 
unappealing food default in place). 
The current studies do not pinpoint the mechanism behind the dodge 
effect. We speculate that one likely mechanism is that many consumers 
mindlessly accept the default. Consequently, they experience a meal that 
is not tasty and attribute that poor experience to the restaurant, rather 
than to their own acceptance of the default. Note, however, that it is not 
necessary for the consumer to experience the default healthy outcome 
for a dodge effect to manifest, as Study 4 demonstrates that consumers 
dodge healthy defaults when initially selecting a restaurant. Other 
mechanisms are also possible. For example, opting out of healthy default 
(to obtain the unhealthy food) may incur physical or psychological costs 
relative to obtaining the same unhealthy food by accepting an unhealthy 
default. Opting out of healthy default requires some effort, but it may 
also signal vice to the decision maker or others, or it may make the 
decision maker feel guilty or feel angry that others appear to be trying to 
make her feel guilty about her choice. Testing these and other specific 
mechanisms is outside the scope of the current paper but is an inter-
esting topic for future research. Regardless of the mechanism, restau-
rants that set a healthy default risk losing customers. 
Thus, while healthy defaults have a strong positive effect on food 
consumption, they may not be the easy answer to the obesity crisis that 
some have suggested, as the dodge effect may present serious hurdles for 
business owners interested in implementing healthy defaults. However, 
consumers may be less likely to dodge healthy defaults when it is not 
feasible to leave one environment and move to another. For example, in 
school lunchrooms and workplace cafeterias where customers have few 
other options but to eat within the facility, implementing healthy de-
faults could provide large health benefits without driving down sales or 
driving away customers. 
It is important to note that the current results indicate that the dodge 
effect will reduce the effect of healthy defaults on consumptions of 
Fig. 5. Return ratings by among participants in study 5. Note: Error bars 
= ±2SE. 
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healthy food relative to what would be expected given no dodge; how-
ever, the net effect of the healthy default on consumption is nevertheless 
still positive: more healthy food is consumed under a healthy default 
than under an unhealthy default. The current studies found large default 
effects but modest sized dodge effects. We computed the net size of 
default effect as the difference between the proportion of participants’ 
choices that stuck with the default and 50%, the proportion expected 
from the hull hypothesis. Similarly, we computed the net size of the 
dodge effect as the difference between the observed proportion of par-
ticipants choosing the healthy default establishment and 50%, as ex-
pected from the null hypothesis (see Table 1). The weighted means of 
net default effect and net dodge effect were 25.6% and 6.9%, respec-
tively, suggesting that the magnitude of dodge effect is roughly 27% of 
the size of the default effect. Thus, although consumers are somewhat 
less likely to patronize a restaurant with a healthy default, compared to 
one with an unhealthy default, once the consumers are inside the 
healthy default restaurant, the default will have a notable effect of food 
choice. 
The primary beneficiary of healthy defaults are consumers, who are 
encouraged to eat foods that benefit their long-term health. An equally 
important set of stake holders, however, are the restaurants and other 
businesses with the power to set healthy defaults. If customers dodge 
healthy defaults, even to a limited extent, businesses stand to lose rev-
enue if they set healthy defaults, relative to setting defaults as the less 
healthy but tastier alternative. Consequently, the dodge effect poses a 
barrier to public health initiatives to encourage businesses to set healthy 
defaults. Future research can examine whether alternatives to healthy 
defaults, such as having no default but always asking consumers to make 
a choice among healthy and unhealthy food options, can eliminate the 
dodge effect and are hence more palatable for businesses. 
Defaults can be a powerful tool to promote healthy eating behavior. 
The current studies provide new evidence and insights into the limita-
tions of default manipulations. Because consumers can dodge the effects 
of defaults, the long-term effects of default manipulations are likely to be 
smaller than previously thought. Such findings can help health officials 
as well as business owners decide what healthy defaults might be 
appropriate to implement, so that people will make more healthy 
choices, and stick with them. 
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